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Abstract 
In the early stage of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the conventional wisdom was that financial under-
development of sub Saharan African economies may have been a bless-ing in disguise because it 
insulated them from the direct effects of the crisis. This paper argues that this may also make African 
exporters, dangerously more dependent on the health of financial institutions in countries where they 
export. In the 2008-2009 financial crisis, we find that African exports to the US have been hit more 
than other countries. On past financial crises (1976-2002), we find that African exporters are more 
vulnerable to recessions in partner countries. Hence, African countries seem more affected by the 
income effect of financial crises. In addition to this income effect, we find that, for the average 
exporter, the disruption effect due to a financial crisis in the partner country is moderate (a deviation 
from the gravity predicted trade of around 2 to 8%) and long lasting (around 7 years). We find 
however that the disruption effect is much larger for African exporters as the fall in trade (relative to 
gravity) is at least 20% more than for other countries in the aftermath of the crisis. Only a part of the 
vulnerability of African exports comes from a composition effect as primary exports are hit more than 
manufacturing exports. We also provide evidence that African countries more dependent on trade 
finance are hit more badly. 
Keywords 




In this paper, we show that African exports are particularly vulnerable to a financial crisis in the 
countries they export to. Our work is motivated by the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Early in the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, a common view was that Africa's low level of financial integration may 
be a blessing in disguise, insulating this region from the direct impact of the financial crisis. Indeed, it 
may be that the direct wealth effect has been less important than in other regions such as East Asia, 
Latin America and Central and Eastern European countries which are more open in terms of financial 
flows than African countries. African banks may indeed have bought less "toxic" assets than others. 
However, we show in this paper that African countries are more affected by trade linkages and that the 
relative under-development of financial systems in sub-saharan African countries, in particular the 
strong dependence on trade credit may make them more vulnerable to the disruption of trade finance 
that comes with the financial crisis in the industrialized countries. 
One indication of the vulnerability of African countries on the trade side is given by the most 
recent US trade statistics. Following the crisis, the fall of US imports from Sub-Saharan African 
countries has been more dramatic than from the rest of the world. From September 2008 - the failure 
of Lehman on September 15 is often seen as the turning point of the crisis - chosen to be the base 
month, the fall in African exports has been much stronger than other exports. This is especially true 
for African manufacturing exports. The rebound of exports to the US since March 2009 is also not 
observed for the African manufacturing sector. This suggests that the fall in African exports is not 
only a composition effect due to the importance of primary goods and the fall in primary goods prices. 
According to the IMF, the fall was very steep from August 2008 to November 2008 but then prices 
stabilized in December 2008 so that the more recent fall in imports of commodities cannot be fully 
explained by price movements only.  
What is behind this sharp fall of African exports to a country that during this period has 
experienced an exceptional financial crisis by historical standards? What does it reveal on the 
vulnerability of African exporters to financial crises in partner countries? What are the mechanisms 
through which a financial crisis in a partner country affects African exports? We attempt to partially 
answer these questions by analyzing the impact of past financial crises on bilateral trade flows. Using 
a large sectoral database of bilateral trade and of financial crises on the period 1972-2002, and a 
gravity equation approach, we quantify the deviation of exports from their "natural" level. The gravity 
approach which is now very standard in trade and has strong theoretical underpinnings, allows us to 
measure the deviation of bilateral exports from the "natural" level of bilateral trade as predicted by 
standard determinants such as GDPs, bilateral distance, trade agreements etc...We distinguish two 
mechanisms through which a financial crisis in a country affects the exports of other countries. There 
is first an income effect as financial crisis are typically associated with sharp recessions (see Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008 and Claessens, Kose and Terrones, 2009), which lead to a fall in consumption and 
imports. Freund (2009) has shown that the elasticity of trade to income has increased in the past forty 
years. According to Irwin (2002) this elasticity was around 2 in the 1960s and 1970s and increased to 
3.4 in the 1990s. In this paper, we show that African exports are more sensitive to large negative 
income movements in the countries they trade with. This is true both for manufacturing and primary 
goods exports. 
Second, for a given fall in income and demand, African exports may be adversely hit by a financial 
crisis due to what we call a disruption effect. The disruption may take direct or more subtle forms. The 
most direct effect, one that has been widely discussed in policy circles is the fall in trade credit. There 
are however more subtle ways through which the financial crisis may negatively affect trade. In 
                                                      
*  Paper prepared for the Conference on “Financial markets, adverse shocks and policy responses in fragile countries”, 
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particular, we have witnessed, although it is difficult to measure it, an increase in risk aversion 
amongst bankers and traders and this may affect more severely countries or groups of countries which 
are viewed as more risky. We show that the disruption effect on trade is more important and longer 
lasting for African countries than for exporters of other regions. Compared with other countries, the 
disruption effect is larger for African exporters (at least -20%), aggravates over time and lasts several 
years after the occurrence of the event. Again, this disruption effect comes in addition to the fall of 
exports due to the fall of income and consumption. This sharp difference applies both for primary 
products and manufactured goods. We also find that for African countries, the largest disruption effect 
comes when the destination country which is hit by a financial crisis is industrialized. Finally, using 
two different proxies for dependence on trade credit, we provide evidence that this dependence may 
explain part of the fragility of African exports to financial crisis in trade partners. 
The pre-crisis economic literature delivers few insights on the effect of such an event on 
international trade. Most studies consider the role of international trade on the probability of 
occurrence of crises (Frankel and Cavallo, 2004) or on their transmission (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
2000, Glick and Rose, 1999), showing in particular that trade linkages may explain crises contagion 
and their regional character. The few papers looking at the impact of crises on trade generally focus on 
currency crises (Berman, 2009, Campa, 2000). Until very recently, the effect of banking crises has 
only been studied so far by Ma and Cheng (2003), who find a negative impact of such events on 
imports and a positive impact on exports in the short-run in the country that experiences the crisis. We 
go further in this paper by studying the short and long-run effects of such events but focusing on the 
effect of exports to countries that are hit by a financial crisis. By so doing, we attempt to improve the 
understanding of the precise channels through which a financial crisis in the rest of the world is 
transmitted to a country's trade. 
A banking crisis, by tightening financial constraints, may importantly affect the patterns of trade. 
The difference between African and others countries may lie in the type of financing used by 
exporters. While firms operating in countries with relatively developed financial markets can use the 
banking system to finance trading operations, African exporters rely on others sources, in particular 
trade finance provided by institutions in the destination country. Trade can be disrupted by a financial 
crisis that affects banks, risk aversion and trust in both the importing and exporting country. This is the 
case for letters of credit (LCs). Importers use LCs issued by their banks (the issuing bank) as a means 
of assuring exporters that they will be paid. If the exporter submits the required documentation 
(invoices, bills of lading, etc.) to its bank (the advising or confirming bank), payment is made to the 
exporter. Letters of credit require both confidence and liquidity to provide finance and insurance about 
payment to the exporter. If confidence or liquidity is missing at any point along the chain from the 
importer to the exporter then the mechanism will not function. The importer creditworthiness may be 
underminded, the issuing bank may have insufficient funds to extend credit to the importer. The 
confirming bank may also lack confidence in the issuing bank. An argument made by Auboin (2009) 
is also that with Basel II rules, when market conditions tighten, capital requirements for trade finance 
instruments tend to increase more than proportionally to the risk when the counterpart is in a 
developing country. Inter-firm trade credit may also be deficient during a financial crisis because of 
the perceived increase in the risk of non-payment. Ronci (2004) indeed reports sharp falls of trade 
finance during the most important emerging markets financial crises of the 1990s. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis and the trade collapse, a burgeoning literature has attempted 
to analyze the sources of the trade collapse. Our paper is clearly part of this literature although it 
focuses on the case of African countries, and on the more issue of the transmission of financial crises 
to the developing world. Regarding the recent crisis, the role of financial conditions and of trade credit 
has in particular been disputed. On the one hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has pushed the 
idea that the trade collapse was partly due to the collapse in trade credit. Auboin, (2009) reports an 
increase in 2008 in spreads on 90 days letters of credit from 10-16 basis points in normal times to 250-
500 basis points for letters issued by developing countries. The report of the African Development The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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Bank (2009) notes that "paradoxically, although African commercial banks are ready to provide 
financing for trade operations, they are unable to do so because the global credit crisis has caused 
many international confirming banks to be forced to temporarily withdraw their credit support from 
the market. This has led to a growing gap between supply and demand for trade financing". Another 
study by the IMF (2009) that surveyed several banks in developed and emerging markets reported a 
sharp increase in the cost of trade finance. 70% of the banks reported that the price for letters of credit 
had risen. Banks also reported that intraregional trade among advanced economies seemed unaffected 
so far by the current crisis. One possible explanation given by the IMF for the collapse of trade from 
emerging and developing countries is that rising costs of trade finance and increased risk perception 
had a severe impact on low margin products: importers may not be able to afford letters of credit. One 
issue is that these contrasting views are based on surveys rather than comprehensive statistics on trade 
finance. As explained by Auboin (2009), the series of trade finance statistics derived from balance of 
payments and BIS banking statistics was discontinued in 2004.  
Recent papers find evidence that the credit conditions observed during the crisis impact export 
performance. This is the case of Chor and Manova (2009), who use data on the evolution of trade 
volumes during the crisis months and find that adverse credit conditions were an important channel 
through which the crisis affected trade flows. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009), Amiti and Weinstein 
(2009) also find evidence on the negative effects of financial crises on exports. The later argue that 
exporters typically turn to banks and other financial firms to handle payments because international 
trade is typically riskier than domestic trade. Collecting payments in foreign countries is more difficult 
than domestically. Also, the added shipping times associated with international trade often mean that 
international transactions take two months longer than domestic transactions. This imposes additional 
working capital requirements on exporters. Using Japanese data, they find that of the 10.5% decline in 
Japanese exports that occurred following the 1997 banking crisis, the direct effect of declining 
negotiating bank health on exports caused about a third of the decline. Bricongne et al. (2009), using 
French firm level data, find that firms in sectors structurally more dependent on external finance were 
the most affected by the crisis. Yet, model-based simulations (Eaton et al., 2009) suggest that the 
contagion to countries world-wide came mainly through the contraction of demand rather than through 
direct financial channels. Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2009), using American data, find no support 
for the hypothesis that trade credit played a role in the trade collapse. 
Section 2 reports results using US import data for analyzing the 2008-2009 crisis effect on African 
exports. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy we choose to quantify the effect of a financial crisis 
in a gravity equation. Section 4 reports our main results on both the income effect and the disruption 
effect of past financial crises and the extent to which African countries were hit differently. 
1. The 2008 financial crisis effect on US imports 
This paper is clearly motivated by the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the trade collapse that followed. 
Hence, in this section we present evidence on that crisis and the way it affected African exports. Given 
the data constraints, we focus on the case of US bilateral imports using monthly data from the US 
International Trade Commission. We want to assess how African exports were hit by the crisis. The 
data ranges from January 2005 to August 2009. We control for a monthly index of US production, for 
monthly bilateral exchange rates and for two different commodity price indexes
1. Our estimated 
equation takes the form:  
 
log(mjt)=α1log(ERjt)+ α2log(Yt)+ α3log(Pjt)+ α4Crisist+α5Crisist×SSAj+κjm+εjt 
 
                                                      
1  The data comes from the IMF International Financial Statistics. The lack of data prevents us from controlling for 
importers' GDP or prices. Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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where mjt denotes US imports from country j in month t, ERjt is the (average) bilateral exchange rate 
between US and country j (an increase means a depreciation of the USD), Yt is the index of US 
industrial production and Pjt is a commodity price index for period t. The variable crisis is a binary 
variable which equals 1 during the period September 2008 to March 2009
2 (both months included), 
and SSAj equals 1 when the exporter country is a Sub-Saharan African countries. We further include 
country×month dummies to control for country-specific variables such as distance, and for seasonality. 
When looking at the impact specific to African countries we will include a full set of time dummies. 
Results are shown in Table 1 below. Columns (a) to (e) include country fixed effects, while 
columns (f) to (j) contain country-month dummies. Column (k) include country-month and time 
dummies; this is our preferred specification to assess the impact of the crisis on US imports from SSA 
countries. The coefficient on the financial crisis variable alone (columns a to c and f to h) is 
insignificant when excluding the industrial production variable, but generally positive and significant 
when production is included. This is in line with the recent suggestion of Eaton et al. (2009) that the 
trade collapse was above all due to the collapse of industrial production. On the contrary, the 
interaction with the African exporter dummies is strongly negative and significant in columns (j) and 
(k). In the next section we will show that this is not a specificity of the current financial crisis, and try 
to investigate the reason of this vulnerability of African exports to financial crises in their destination 
countries. 
Table 1: Trade in the 2008 financial crisis 
 
 
                                                      
2  We have chosen the starting date of the financial crisis in Spetember 2008 because of the Lehman collapse. Whether the 
financial crisis (but not the economic crisis) ended in April 2009 is more debatable (see IMF 2009b on this) but our 
results are the same if we assumed that the financial crisis was still going on until the end of our sample. 
Dep. Var.
Estimation a b c d e f g h i j k
Log(Bilateral Exchange Rate) -0,07 -0,062 -0,06 -0,047 -0,045 -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.333*** -0.328*** -0.336***
(0,055) (0,054) (0,054) (0,055) (0,055) (0,020) (0,020) (0,020) (0,020) (0,020) (0,020)
Log(Commodity Price Index, all) 0.302*** -0,216 -0.427* 0.284** 0,41 0,288
(0,039) (0,252) (0,255) (0,129) (0,843) (0,865)
Log(Commodity Price Index, energy) 0.442** 0.533** -0,108 -0,066
(0,212) (0,213) (0,718) (0,727)
Log(US Industrial Production) 1.779*** 1.354*** 1.406* 0,878
(0,196) (0,215) (0,743) (0,843)
Financial Crisis -0,043 0,013 0,016 0.051* 0.051** 0,05 0,097 0,096 0,134 0.423***
(0,028) (0,029) (0,029) (0,029) (0,026) (0,088) (0,090) (0,090) (0,099) (0,106)
Financial Crisis*African Exporter 0,063 -1.002*** -1.006***
(0,082) (0,201) (0,201)
Observations 7469 7469 7469 7351 7351 7469 7469 7469 7351 7351 7469
R-squared 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,59 0,6 0,6
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Country*Month Dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
T i m e  D u m m i e s N oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oN oY e s
Panel (within) estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust SE in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Financial crisis: dummy equal to 1 from Sept. 2008 to March 2009, 0 otherwise.
Log(Bilateral US Imports)The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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2. Empirical methodology 
In this section, we use data on past financial crisis to analyze the impact of such crises on trade and the 
specificity of African exports. The econometric specification we present is based on the gravity 
equation. There is now a large literature that addresses the various difficulties to estimate a gravity 
equation (see for example Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). Our aim is to understand how a financial 
crisis in year t, country i (the importer country) affects exports of countries j. We think about a 
financial crisis in the importer country as potentially affecting several of the standard determinants of 
the gravity equation that would typically be generated by a monopolistic competition trade model: 
•  the income of the importer country Yit: this is the direct income effect. As the financial crisis hits 
the income of the importer country, it also leads to lower consumption and therefore lower 
imports. One question is whether the income effect has been different during the 2008-2009 
crisis and whether African exports are more elastic to recessions in the trading partners. These 
are issues which have also partly been addressed by Freund (2009). 
•  the bilateral trade costs between countries i and j, Tijht: broadly speaking if a financial/banking 
crisis hits the importer country this may affect its imports over and above the direct effect it has 
on income. In particular, if importers or exporters rely heavily on credit for their trading relation 
the effect may be more important than the income effect. We call this the trade disruption effect. 
•  the price index of the importer country i Pit: if prices fall in the importer country this has a 
negative impact on imports of the country. 
We also want to control for the other standard gravity determinants which may or may not be affected 
by a financial crisis in country i, such as the income of the exporter country Yjt, a country pair-sector 
fixed effect to control for all time independent determinants of the bilateral trade relation in the sector 
(ηijh) and a year fixed effect (ξt) that controls for all determinants of trade which are common to all 
countries during a year, such as for example changes in commodity prices.  
Hence, the first type of regressions have the following form (1): 
() () () ( )
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where mijht are the bilateral exports from j to i in sector h in year t. Pjt is the producer price of the 
exporter countries, and Pit is the price index of the importer country. FCit is a binary variable which 
equals 1 when country i experienced a financial crisis at year t. The coefficients βk are the coefficients 
of main interest in this regression. To look at the short to medium run impact of crises we will include 
one lead and three lags of the crises dummies (i.e. a=-1,b=3). We will also estimate the persistent or 
long-run effects of the financial crises on the trade relation by introducing more lags, i.e. a=-2,b=7. 
The number of lags is mainly chosen here to keep a maximum number of crises in the sample, but 
inclusion of a different number of lags does not change the results. This allows us to estimate the 
persistence of the effect of the financial crisis on the trade relation. We also control in the same 
manner for the occurrence of a currency crises through the inclusion of dummy variables CCit which 
equals 1 when country i experienced a currency crisis at year t. 
We then want to assess whether the impact of a financial crisis in the importer country on the 
exports of the exporter country is different if the exporter country is Sub-Saharan African. To do this, 
we add to regression (1) interaction terms in the following way (where the currency crises dummies 
are included): Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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Here the coefficients λk inform us on the potential additional effect on African exporters of a financial 
crisis in the importer country.  
In these regressions, the price index in particular of the importer country that may be hit by a 
financial crisis is proxied by the producer price index. However, in theoretical models from which the 
gravity equation is derived, this price index is the ideal price index which is not observable. Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2004), among others, highlight the biases that can arise when omitting this term and 
the various solutions to the estimation problem raised by it. One solution is (see Martin et al. (2008) 
for example), assuming a CES demand structure, to eliminate the price index of the importer country 
by estimating all imports mijht imports of i from j relative to the imports of country i from a base 
country. Since the price index of the importer does not depend on the characteristics of the exporter, it 
cancels out here, which solves the mentioned issue. In this case, however, we cannot estimate the 
average disruption effect, since the FCit terms cancel each other in the relative version of (2). 
However, we can still estimate whether African exports to a country hit by a financial crisis are 
affected differently. This estimation is then (3): 
ijht j k it b k
b
a k
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where the short cut Δb designates the fact that all variables are in difference with respect to the base 
country b. 
In the following estimations, we use USA as the benchmark country; robustness checks have been 
made using other benchmark countries. Finally, we also include year dummies ξt. 
3. Data 
Gravity Variables. We use a large sectoral database of bilateral trade which combines COMTRADE 
and CEPII data for bilateral trade, for 26 ISIC 3-digit industries between 1976 and 2002.
3 To study the 
effect of financial crises on primary goods sectors as well we complete this database using 
COMTRADE for five different primary good sectors. The relative prices are captured by the price 
levels of GDP; prices and GDP data come from the Penn World Tables v.6.1. Due to lack of data 
availability, we cannot use sector-specific prices. We will run robustness checks including 
industry×year dummies to control for sector-specific price changes. 
Financial Crises. The data on banking crises comes from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Their list 
of banking crises is highly consistent with previous studies, and includes a sizeable number of 
countries and years. Moreover, they provide a description of each crisis and a distinction between 
small - "borderline" - and large - "systemic" - crises. Table 4 and 4 bis in appendix report the data. We 
concentrate on the 117 systemic crises that they define as events - possibly lasting several years - 
where much or all bank capital was exhausted. 
                                                      
3  A more detailed description of the trade, production and prices database is available on the CEPII's website, at the 
following address: http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
7 
Because currency and banking crises often happen simultaneously but may have very different 
effects on trade, we need to control for currency crises. We compute indexes following "foreign 
exchange market pressure" methodology, which is the most widely used method to deal with currency 
crises.
4 The computed index takes into account both exchange rate and international reserves 
variations: it is a weighted average of these two indicators with weights such that the two components 
have equal sample volatility. Large positive readings of this index indicate speculative attacks. 
Following Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), a crisis is said to occur when this index exceeds one and a 
half standard deviations above its mean. 
Put together, our database covers 76 countries and 27 3-digits ISIC manufacturing sectors and 5 
primary sectors over the period 1976-2002. 
                                                      
4  See for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Hong and Tornell (2005) or Eichengreen and Bordo (2000) for details 
about the computation. Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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4. Results 
4.1 The Total effect of financial crises on trade 
We first provide some evidence of the impact of financial crises on trade on the whole sample. To do 
so, we have to estimate equation (1), which is likely to be biased to some extent due to the omission of 
the price indexes. We will then turn to a more detailed investigation of the different transmission 
channels (income and disruption effects) and to the specific case of African countries. Table 2 contains 
the results. The standard gravity variables coefficients display the expected signs. Financial crisis are 
found to have a negative impact on both exports and imports, with a more immediate impact on 
imports. Controlling for GDP and prices, imports are found to be 2.3% lower the year of a financial 
crisis, and 8% lower the following year (column 2). Interestingly, this negative effect is found to be 
significant even controlling for changes in income and prices: when excluding these variables, the 
effect of the crisis is more negative, up to 8% the first year and 10% the following year, suggesting 
that the impact of financial crises on trade also channels through income and prices changes. 
Figure 2 is based on the estimated coefficient and confidence intervals of the specification similar 
to the one presented in Table 2, column (2), but with additional leads and lags. It shows the deviation 
of bilateral imports before and after a financial crisis that takes place in year t=0. The x-axis represents 
the "natural trade" level as given by the gravity equation, and the figure can therefore be interpreted as 
the deviation from this level. The 5% confidence intervals are depicted by dotted lines around the 
estimated effect. The rest of figures in the paper are constructed similarly even though we do not 
report all the associated regressions. 
The estimate effect in the short-run is very close to the one presented in Table 2. We can see in 
Figure 2 that the impact is then persistent, with trade remaining below its precrisis level for at least 
seven year after the event. 
Figure 2. Exports after financial crisis in partner countries 
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Table 2: Total effect of financial crises on trade 
4.2 The income effect 
A first way through which a financial crisis can hit trade is directly through a fall in demand for all 
imports due to a fall of the income of the importers. This is the standard trade channel that most 
macroeconomists have in mind when thinking about the effect of the current financial crisis on trade. 
In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz model, the effect of a change of income in country i on its imports is the 
same for all goods and sectors. The elasticity of demand to income is simply 1. However, there may be 
reasons for which the income elasticity of demand of imports may be different in different sectors. 
Dep Var. : 
Estimation: (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln GDP importer 1.311*** 1.288***
(0,032) (0,032)
ln GDP exporter 1.345*** 1.299***
(0,030) (0,030)
ln Price importer -0.537*** -0.578*** -0.631***
(0,020) (0,021) (0,022)
ln Price exporter 0.969*** 0.912*** 0.852***
(0,018) (0,019) (0,019)
FC importer (t) -0.023*** -0.040*** -0.063***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,007)
FC importer (t-1) -0.080*** -0.095*** -0.114***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,007)
FC importer (t-2) -0.047*** -0.066*** -0.055***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,007)
FC importer (t-3) -0.080*** -0.119*** -0.125***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,008)
FC importer (t+1) 0.021*** 0.099*** 0.115***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,008)
FC exporter -0.022*** -0.034*** -0.024***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,008)
FC exporter(t-1) 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.032***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,008)
FC exporter(t-2) 0,003 -0.020*** -0.038***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,008)
FC exporter(t-3) -0.108*** -0.159*** -0.160***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,009)
FC exporter (t+1) 0,003 0.070*** 0.060***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,008)
Observations 868711 868711 868711 868711
R-squared 0,88 0,88 0,87 0,87
parentheses. ***, ** and * for respectively for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
ln(Bilateral Trade)
Panel, within / fixed effects estimations. All estimations include year dummies. Currency 
crises coefficients not reported. Robust SE clustered at the country-pair-sector level in Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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Hence, a first question to address is whether Sub-Saharan African countries are specialized in sectors 
for which the income elasticity of demand is different from other countries. More formally, we want to 
estimate α2, the income elasticity of demand. Note that this means that to estimate this important 
elasticity, we cannot use the "relative" gravity equation (1) but (3), so that the price index potential 
bias cannot be eliminated. 
The results are given in table 3. Regression (a) shows that the income elasticity for all countries is 
above unity in our sample. For African countries, this elasticity is not higher as shown by the fact that 
the interaction between the income of the destination country and a dummy for African Exporters is 
not significant. Hence, African countries seem to be more specialized in sectors which respond more 
to the income level of the importer countries. However, the current crisis is not a small change in 
income and it may be that the effect is not linear. It particular, it may be that the income elasticity of 
imports is even larger during large recessions than during mild ones. This is what we test in 
regressions (b) and (c) where we study whether large variations in GDP have a larger effect on imports 
and whether African countries are more vulnerable to this type of negative shock. We construct a 
dummy variable which we call 'slowdown', and is equal to 1 when the variation of GDP between t and 
t-1 is lower than the first quartile of the country over the period. In both specifications, bilateral 
imports are found to respond more negatively to large changes in GDP: the coefficient on the 
slowdown variable is negative and significant even when controlling for GDP. Moreover, the impact 
of the slowdown variable is much higher for African exporters The total estimated effect is 
quantitatively important (6% on average). Hence, the conclusion is that African exports seem 
particularly vulnerable to recessions in the countries to which their export. This is consistent with the 
large recent drop of African exports (larger than in other regions) to the US that we have documented 
in the introduction. 
In regressions (d) to (g), we ran the same regression as in specification (b) and (c) but separate the 
manufacturing and primary sectors. We first see that for all countries, exports of the manufacturing 
sectors are more sensitive to a recession of the destination country. This is even more so for African 
countries as the interaction term between the African dummy and the drop in GDP of the destination 
country is negative and significant (columns d and e). However, the elasticity of African exports in the 
primary sector to income in the destination country is higher than for the manufacturing sector. Hence, 
we conclude that African exports are more vulnerable to GDP fluctuations in the countries they export 
to in both types of sectors. Interestingly, in unreported regressions, we found that all these results are 
unchanged if we control for the occurrence of a financial crisis in the destination country (as in the 
regressions above). This suggests that the income effect (even in the case of recessions) and the 
disruption effect are two distinct mechanisms that negatively affect African exports. The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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Table 3. Income effects 
 
4.3 The disruption effect 
We now analyze how African exports react after a financial crisis takes place in the partner country, 
i.e. the country of destination. The results are shown in Table 4. Remember that in these regressions, 
we control for the common effect that the change on the income of the importer country has on all 
imports, for all determinants of sectoral bilateral sectoral trade which are time invariant (through the 
inclusion of country pair×sector fixed effects), for yearly changes in trade which are common to all 
countries (through the inclusion of year fixed effects) and for the effects of currency crises in the 
destination countries. In columns (4) and (5) we also control for exporter×year or for sector×year 
dummies. This allows in particular to control for country or sector-specific price changes which are 
not properly captured by our relative price variable. Whatever the specification, African exports are 
found to be much more negatively affected than other countries by a crisis in the destination country. 
The magnitude of the effect decreases slightly when including exporter×year fixed effects, but the 
additional drop of African exports is always above 20% during the year of the crisis. Column (1) in 
Table 4 reports the estimates obtained with an estimation in level of the gravity equation, i.e. without 
taking into account the price index issue. The results are relatively similar: the fall of exports 
following a crisis in partner country is dramatically higher for African countries, and very long lasting. 
Finally, note that these results are unchanged when modifying the number of lags. In columns (3), we 
study the reaction of imports as well, i.e. we ask the following question: are African imports more 
affected by a crisis in exporter countries? As shown in Table 2, the results are much less insignificant. 
African imports are even found to react more positively after one year, but the effect is short-lived. 
Trade disruption following a financial crisis in a country therefore affects the exports of Sub-Saharan 
African countries to the crisis hit country but not their imports from this country.  
Dep. Var: 
Estimation (a) (b) (c ) (d) (e) (f) (g)
ln GDP Importer 1.348*** 1.343*** 1.345*** 1.375*** 1.377*** 0.940*** 0.943***
(0,030) (0,030) (0,030) (0,031) (0,033) (0,093) (0,093)
ln GDP Importer*African Exporter -0.183*** -0.176***  -0.171**  -0.666***
(0,068) (0,068) (0,070) (0,192)
Slowdown in GDP Importer (1) -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0,018 -0,019
(0,004) (0,004) (0,004) (0,004) (0,012) (0,012)
Slowdown in GDP Importer*African Exporter -0.056** -0.043* -0.059**  -0.046** -0,041 -0,017
(0,023) (0,022) (0,024) (0,023) (0,056) (0,062)
Controls
ln GDP Exporter 1.302*** 1.311*** 1.302*** 1.363*** 0.250** 1.354*** 0.249**
(0,032) (0,032) (0,032) (0,033) (0,100) (0,033) (0,100)
ln Price destination -0.547*** -0.537*** -0.547*** -0.557*** 0,004 -0.567*** -0,032
(0,020) (0,020) (0,020) (0,020) (0,058) (0,021) (0,059)
ln Price Importer 0.970*** 0.972*** 0.973*** 1.013*** 0.525*** 1.014*** 0.526***
(0,018) (0,018) (0,018) (0,019) (0,054) (0,019) (0,054)
Obs. 791593 77118 791593 77118
Adj. R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0,88 0,86 0,88 0,86
868711
(1): Dummy equal to 1 when variation gdp from t-1 to t  lower than first quartile.  Within estimations with year dummies. 
***, ** and *  for respectively for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Robust SE clustered at the country-pair-sector level in parentheses.
Primary Sect. Manuf. Sect.
ln (Bilateral Trade)Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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The results are easier to see on the figure 4, where we run the same regression as in column (2), Table 
4 but with more lags to study the long-run effects. It shows the deviation of African exports before and 
after a financial crisis that takes place in year t=0, with respect to the average disruption effect. The x-
axis therefore represents the average disruption effect. Again, our benchmark country here is USA but 
similar results are obtained with other benchmarks. The disruption effect is stronger: the year the 
country is hit by a financial crisis, the additional effect for African exports is around 35%. This 
Dep Var. :  ln Bilateral Trade
Estimation: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Relative GDP 0.768*** 0.769*** 0.086** 0.770***
(0,025) (0,025) (0,015) (0,010)
ln Relative Prices -0.485*** -0.485***  -0.348***  -0.486***
(0,009) (0,009) (0,006) (0,005)
ln GDP importer 1.285***
(0,032)
ln GDP exporter 1.298***
(0,030)
ln Price importer -0.590***
(0,021)
ln Price exporter 0.913***
(0,019)
FC importer*African exporter -0.315*** -0.372*** -0.379***  -0.229***  -0.379***
(0,070) (0,079) (0,079) (0,056) (0,057)
FC importer (t-1)*African exporter -0.359*** -0.378*** -0.385***  -0.277***  -0.382***
(0,065) (0,078) (0,079) (0,052) (0,052)
FC importer (t-2)*African exporter -0.144** -0,116 -0.122* -0,066  -0.115**
(0,061) (0,072) (0,072) (0,050) (0,050)
FC importer (t-3)*African exporter -0.174*** -0.157*** -0.161***  -0.139***  -0.162***
(0,051) (0,058) (0,058) (0,042) (0,042)
FC importer (t+1)*African exporter -0,101 0.158* 0.158* 0.290*** 0.146***
(0,078) (0,094) (0,094) (0,062) (0,062)
FC exporter*African importer -0,046
(0,046)
FC exporter(t-1)*African importer 0.092**
(0,046)
FC exporter(t-2)*African importer 0.108**
(0,047)
FC exporter(t-3)*African importer -0.151***
(0,055)
FC exporter (t+1)*African importer 0.122**
(0,048)
Observations 868711 868711 868711 868711 868711
R-squared 0,88 0,86 0,86 0,87 0,86
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No No
Exporter-year dummies No No No Yes No
Sector-year dummies No No No No Yes
Panel, within / fixed effects estimations. Currency crises coefficients not reported.  Robust SE clustered
 at the country-pair-sector level in parentheses. ***, ** and * for respectively for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
ln Relative ImportsThe Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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phenomenon is deepened after one year, when the effect aggravates at -45%. Note again that that this 
number measures the disruption of trade that comes from the financial crisis and not the fall of income 
of the crisis-hit country as this is controlled for. The fall is also long lasting as it disappears only four 
years after the crisis in the partner country or even seven years if we accept a 10% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3: Exports after financial crisis in partner country, Africa 






























4.4 Channels of transmission 
Composition effect. We now attempt to understand the sources of the disruption effect. The first 
possibility is that African countries are specialized in sectors that are particularly vulnerable to a 
financial crisis. In particular, African exports are more concentrated on primary goods and raw 
materials than on manufactured goods, and trade in these goods may be more dependent on the 
financial system. We test this by distinguishing between exports of primary goods and raw materials 
on the one hand, and manufactured goods on the other hand. We see indeed in Figure 5a and 5b that 
African exports of primary goods and raw materials are hit a bit more strongly by a financial crisis in 
the destination country than exports of manufactured goods. The short-term results are given in Table 
6, column (1) (appendix). Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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Figure 4a and 4b: African exports after financial crisis in partner country, by commodity 
























































From this point of view, this is consistent with the present crisis as we saw in the introduction that 
exports to the US of primary goods and raw materials were more strongly hit by the financial crisis in 
the US than exports of manufacturing goods. Hence, part of the fragility of African exports to a 
financial crisis in the countries to which they export may come from a composition effect. But clearly, 
the composition effect does not explain everything. The exports of African countries are much more 
affected by a financial crisis in the destination country, and this is true both for manufacturing and non 
manufacturing sectors. 
Origin of the crisis. Motivated by the present financial crisis which, at least in its initial phase is 
mostly concentrated on the industrialized countries, we also have also estimated the effect on trade 
depending on whether the crisis originated in a industrialized country. Figures 5a and 5b shows again 
that African exporters are more vulnerable to a crisis in the countries to which they export whatever 
the country of origin, but remarkably, this vulnerability is stronger when the crisis hits an 
industrialized country, especially in the short-run. When the crisis comes from an industrialized 
market, the reaction of African exports is found to be twice more negative in the first two years. The 
crisis comes from a non-industrialized country, the effect is generally only significant a 10%. Again, 
the results of a specification with three lags are reported in Table 5, estimation (2) (appendix). The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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Figures 5a and 5b: African exports after financial crisis in partner country, 
by origin of the crisis 
Figure 5a: African exports after financial crisis, 

































Figure 5b: African exports after financial crisis, 
































Trade credit. As mentioned in section 2, one of the main reasons that may explain the drop in exports 
of African countries when their trading partners are facing a financial crisis is related to the disruption 
of trade finance. If the low level of development of their financial system forces African firms to rely 
more heavily on trade finance from the importing country, and if this type of financing is particularly 
hit by financial crises (Ronci, 2004), exports of African countries may be hit harder whatever the 
sector considered. As a proxy for trade finance, we first follow Ronci (2004) and use the level of 
outstanding short-term credit in U.S. dollars as reported in the Global Development Finance (GDF), 
which includes short-term credit for trade in dollars as reported by the OECD and the international 
banks' short-term claims as reported by the BIS. As already pointed out by Ronci (2004), this variable 
has several limitations, in particular since it excludes trade financing associated with intra-firm trade 
by multinational corporations or trade related to foreign direct investment. 
For each country, we construct the average ratio of trade credit over total exports over the period. 
As shown in Table 7 (appendix), African countries clearly display a higher level of dependence upon 
trade finance: the median (mean) of the ratio is 0.74 (0.95) for African countries, and only 0.47 (0.60) 
for the rest of the sample. This dependence of African on trade finance is also noted by Jinjarak 
(2007). Can dependence on trade finance explain the vulnerability of African trade to crises in partner 
countries? To answer this question, we generate a dummy variable equal to 1 when this average ratio Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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for the exporter country is above the median of the whole sample, and we interact it with the 
interaction financial crisis*African exporter. The coefficient on this triple interaction therefore gives 
the additional impact financial crises on African countries more dependent upon trade finance. The 
results are represented in Figures 6a and 6b. African countries which display a higher level of trade 
finance clearly experience a larger drop of their exports to countries hit by a financial crisis in the first 
years. 
Figures 6a and 6b: African exports after financial crisis in partner country, 
by level of trade finance 
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We also constructed another proxy for trade finance, which comes from the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the WorldBank during the year 2000. Firms have been 
asked the percentage of their total financing coming from their suppliers. We use the country average 
of this variable as a proxy for dependence upon trade credit, and interact our financial crisis variable 
with a dummy which equals 1 if the country is above the median of the whole sample. Because the 
data is only available for a few countries, we cannot generate the same triple interaction as before. 
Thus, here we do not look at African countries specifically but more generally at whether countries 
with different levels of dependence upon trade finance react differently to financial crises. The results 
are shown in Figure 7 and in Table 6, column (d) (appendix). In Figure 7 we see that countries which 
display a higher dependence upon trade credit react more negatively in the short-run to a financial 
crisis in the destination country. Moreover, controlling for this interaction term importantly decreases 
the significance of the additional effect on African countries (Table 6, column (d)). which remain only The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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significant the year following the crisis. Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution, as 
we use only proxies for trade finance. But they however suggest that this particular type of financing 
may play an important role in Africa in the aftermath of financial crises, and more generally in the 
transmission of financial crisis through international trade linkages. 
Figures 7: Exports after financial crisis in partner country, high trade finance 






























Finally, in unreported regression we have interacted the level of financial development of the exporter
5 
with our financial crisis variable. The negative effect of the financial crisis in the destination country is 
magnified by a high financial development in the exporter country. This both suggests that a low 
financial development may insulate countries from external financial shocks, but that a high 
dependence upon trade finance may exacerbate the effect of the shock, especially in the short-run. 
5. Conclusion 
Our paper has documented several specific features of African exports during events of financial 
crises. Our main conclusion is that contrary to some arguments that have been heard early in the 2008-
2009 crisis, sub-Saharan African countries may be hit harder by the crisis through its effect on the 
exports of the region. Even though the direct effects of the crisis may be weaker due to the relative 
insulation and underdevelopment of the financial system in most sub-Saharan African countries, the 
indirect effect through trade may be stronger. We found that in the past financial crises, African 
exports have been hit harder and longer by recessions and financial crisis in countries they export to. 
This is not only due to the composition of African exports and the concentration on primary goods. 
Both primary and manufactured exports are hit harder in African countries than in other regions. 
Another finding is that African exports are hit hardest when the importer country is an industrialized 
country. We have also found that the higher dependence of African exports on trade finance may 
explain this particular fragility of African exporters to a financial crisis in importer countries. One 
interpretation is that during a financial crisis when uncertainty is high, trust and liquidity are low, 
banks and firms in the importer country first cut exposure and credit to particular countries which are 
seen as more risky. This would in particular affect trade finance through letters of credit where the 
importer pays the exporting firm in advance. It is also likely that during financial crisis, financial 
institutions "renationalize" their operations and reduce their exposure to foreign banks and firms. 
                                                      
5  Financial development is defined by the ration of private credit over GDP. The data comes from Beck (2003). 
 Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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Exporters in countries with a strong financial system may be able to better resist to such retrenchment 
of foreign banks. Clearly, for African firms which are more dependent on foreign finance, this option 
may not be feasible. At this stage, these interpretations of our results are only tentative and more 
research needs to be done to better understand the origin of the particular fragility of African exports 
to financial crises in industrialized countries. 
Our paper can be viewed as contradicting the implicit policy conclusion that come from the early 
conventional wisdom. The underdevelopment of financial systems in Africa is not a "blessing in 
disguise" in the current crisis. If the cost of such low development is that African exporters are very 
dependent on external trade finance, then the real cost of the financial crisis on Africa may actually be 
higher due to the underdevelopment of financial systems. This also suggests that it is particularly 
important to target the $250 billion for trade finance promised by the G20 on those countries which 
are more dependent on trade finance. This would entail concentrating this aid on African exporters. The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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Appendix 




Dep Var. : 
Estimation:
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef.  S.E.
ln Relative GDP 0.765*** (0,012) 0.767*** (0,012) 0.180*** (0,046) 0.985*** (0,082) 0.780*** (0,027)
ln Relative Prices -0.485*** (0,006) -0.485*** (0,006) -0.426*** (0,014) -0.413*** (0,023)  -0.473*** (0,009)
FCj*African exporter -0.371*** (0,069) -0.219** (0,110) -0.495*** (0,084) -0,148 (0,162)
(t-1) -0.377*** (0,067) -0.265*** (0,100) -0.611*** (0,082) -0.330* (0,174)
(t-2) -0.116* (0,062) -0.159* (0,090) -0.209*** (0,076) -0,084 (0,169)
(t-3) -0.157*** (0,050) -0.175** (0,075) -0.216*** (0,068) -0,236 (0,161)
(t+1) 0.158* (0,084) 0.327** (0,131) 0,077 (0,097) 0,05 (0,177)










FCj*African exporter*High Trade Finance (1) 0,033 (0,472)









FCj*Financial Development  -0.063*** (0,009)
(t-1)  -0.168*** (0,009)
(t-2)  -0.084*** (0,009)




finance proxy. (2) WBES trade credit proxy. Robust SE clustered at the country-pair-sector level in parentheses.
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Algeria 1990  - 
Argentina 1980-82, 1989-90, 1995, 2001  - 
Australia 1989-1992
Austria  -   - 
Bangladesh 1987  - 
Belgium  -   - 
Benin 1988-1990  - 
Bolivia 1986-1988, 1994  - 
Botswana  -  1994-1995
Brazil 1990, 1994-1999  - 
Burkina Faso 1988-94  - 
Cameroon 1987-93, 1995-98  - 
Canada  -  1983-1985
Central African Republic 1976, 1988  - 
Chile 1976, 1981-1986  - 
China 1998  - 
Colombia 1982, 1987  - 
Costa Rica 1987 1984
Côte divoire 1988  - 
Denmark  -  1987-92
Djibouti 1991-1993  - 
Ecuador 1981, 1996-97, 1998-…  - 
Egypt 1981 1991-1995
El Salvador 1989  - 
Equatorial Guinea  1983-1985  - 
Erithrea 1993  - 
Ethiopia  -  1994
Finland 1991-1994  - 
France  -  1994
Germany  -  1977
Ghana 1982-1989 1997
Greece  -  1991-95
Guinea 1985, 1993  - 
Hong Kong  -  1982-1983, 1983-86, 1998
Iceland  -  1985-1986, 1993
India  -  1993
Indonesia 1997 1994
Israel 1977-83  - 
Italy  -  1990-95
Jamaica 1994, 1995-2000  - 
Japan 1991-…  - 
Kenya 1985-1989, 1992, 1993-1995  - 
Banking Crises
Note: For a detailed description of each event, see Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).The Vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa to the Financial Crisis: The Case of Trade 
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Table 6b: Banking Crises 
 
Country Systemic Borderline
Korea 1997  - 
Lebanon 1988-90  - 
Liberia 1991  - 
Madagascar 1988  - 
Malaysia 1997 1985-88
Mali 1987  - 
Mauritania 1984  - 
Mexico 1981-91, 1994-97  - 
Morocco 1981  - 
Nepal 1988  - 
Netherland  -   - 
New Zealand  -  1987-90
Nicaragua 1989-1996  - 
Nigeria 1993 1997
Norway 1987-1993  - 
Pakistan  -   - 
Panama 1988-89  - 
Paraguay 1995-1999 2001
Peru 1983-90  - 
Philippines 1981, 1998  - 
Portugal  -   - 
Senegal 1988  - 
Singapour  -  1982
South Africa  -  1977
Spain 1977-1985  - 
Sri Lanka 1989-93  - 
Swaziland 1995  - 
Sweden 1991  - 
Switzerland  -   - 
Taiwan 1997-98 1983-1984, 1995
Thailand 1983, 1997  - 
Togo 1993, 1994, 1995  - 
Tunisia  -  1991
Turkey 1982-85, 2000 1994
UK  -  1974-1976
Uruguay 1981-1984, 2002  - 
USA  -  1984
Venezuela 1994-1995   - 
Vietnam  -   - 
Yemen 1996  - 
Zambia 1995  - 
Zimbabwe  -   - 
Banking Crises
Note: For a detailed description of each event, see Caprio and Klingebiel (2003).Nicolas Berman and Philippe Martin 
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Var. : Trade Credit Proxy / GDP Observations  Mean Median  Std Deviation
African Countries 506565 0,95 0,75 0,70
Rest of World 1132737 0,60 0,48 0,40 
 
 